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WHEN THE SUPREME COURT DEPARTS 
FROM ITS TRADITIONAL FUNCTION 
Isaac J. Colunga* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Generally, state courts can offer more protections under their own 
state laws than under the Federal Constitution.1  Sometimes, however, 
state courts extend that sentiment to decisions based solely on federal 
law.  They do so either by interpreting the Federal Constitution more 
broadly or perhaps by adding their own state requirements to a federal 
question.  What results is ―a competing constitutional vision,‖ through 
which state courts fill the void where federal laws fail to adequately 
protect their citizens‘ civil rights.  But these decisions are not 
unyielding.2 
Starting in the late-1970s, the United States Supreme Court began 
reversing state court judgments that applied an expansive interpretation 
of federal law in favor of state citizens.  In doing so, the Supreme Court 
strayed from its traditional role.  In those instances that it reversed the 
state court judgments, it did not expound new law, it did not curtail state 
officials from mistreating defendants, and it did not ensure that a person 
who sought to vindicate a federal right had been properly heard.  
Instead, the Supreme Court simply reviewed the facts of each case and 
found fault with the state court‘s application of federal law.3  This 
happened most recently in Michigan v. Fisher.4 
                                                 
*  The author serves as a law clerk to the Honorable Charles R. Norgle of the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
1 See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 44 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (―It is 
incumbent on a state court, therefore, when it determines that its State‘s laws call for 
protection more complete than the Federal Constitution demands, to be clear about its 
ultimate reliance on state law.‖); State v. Debooy, 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000) (―[W]e have 
stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction [than 
the U.S. Constitution] where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this 
state‘s citizens.‖); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (advocating that state courts should have 
the opportunity to provide more protections under their state laws); cf. David J. Robinson, 
Admissibility of Government Wiretaps After People v. Coleman, 98 ILL. B.J. 44, 45 (Jan. 2010) 
(―The crucial distinction between the Illinois proscription against eavesdropping and its 
federal counterpart is that under the Illinois statute, both parties to the conversation must 
agree to have their conversation recorded, while under the federal statute only one party 
need consent.‖). 
2  Justin R. Long, Demosprudence, Interactive Federalism, and Twenty Years of Sheff v. 
O‘Neill, 42 CONN. L. REV. 585, 588 (2009) (citing Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional 
Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 95 (2000)). 
3 Vincent Martin Bonventre, Changing Roles:  The Supreme Court and the State High Courts 
in Safeguarding Rights, 70 ALB. L. REV. 841, 846–50 (2007) (collecting cases in which the 
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There, the Supreme Court overruled a state court decision that 
employed an expansive interpretation of the emergency aid doctrine, 
thus concluding that local authorities, despite what the state courts said, 
had not violated the defendant‘s Fourth Amendment rights.5  Critics 
maintain that this sort of appellate review has dramatically altered the 
relationship between state tribunals and the Supreme Court.6  Thus, 
using Michigan v. Fisher as a primary example, this article attempts to 
explain how this relationship has been altered. 
Warrantless searches have long been the subject of intense 
courtroom drama.  Traditionally they are not allowed and even 
abhorred,7 unless of course the facts of a particular case justify the 
application of one of the few exceptions to their bar.8  But if the facts do 
not support an exception, a defendant more often than not can stave off 
conviction by moving to quash any evidence that the state may have 
acquired through the warrantless search.  There is nothing unique about 
this scenario, as it is played out routinely in state and federal courtrooms 
across the country. 
What is unique, however, is the set of circumstances that underlies 
each case.  Typically, when considering a motion to quash based on an 
unlawful search, the trial court will conduct an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the police officers involved in the incident entered 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court found fault with state court decisions to protect their citizens‘ liberties 
excessively). 
4 130 S. Ct. 546 (2009). 
5 Id. at 549 (explaining that ―[t]he Michigan Court of Appeals required more than what 
the Fourth Amendment demands‖). 
6 See Bonventre, supra note 3, at 846; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1069 (1983) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Until recently we had virtually no interest in cases of this type.‖).  
Stevens is referring to cases in which the state courts did not mistreat its citizen, but 
protected him or her under federal law.  Long, 463 U.S. at 1068–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
7 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (explaining that it is a ―‗basic principle of 
Fourth Amendment law‘ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable‖); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971) 
(stating that ―a search or seizure carried out on a suspect‘s premises without a warrant is 
per se unreasonable, unless the police can show‖ an exception); see also United States v. U.S. 
Dist. Court (Plamondon), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (―[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief 
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .‖). 
8 See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (clarifying that courts have 
recognized only a few emergency exceptions that justify warrantless searches); see also 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (finding warrantless entry justified where 
ongoing fire was present); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (holding that 
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon justifies a warrant search); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 770–71 (1966) (noting that officers may enter a home without a warrant to impede the 
destruction of evidence). 
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the defendant‘s home lawfully.9  At this point the state usually argues 
that an exception applies justifying the warrantless search.  On the other 
hand, the defendant argues that the alleged exception does not apply 
making the officers‘ search an intrusion on the defendant‘s privacy.  The 
trial court may consider not only the physical circumstances of each case 
but also the intent of the police officers, which the parties may establish 
using oral testimony and perhaps a detailed description of the scene.10  
With this backdrop, the trial court makes credibility determinations, 
considers the effectiveness of the parties‘ witnesses, and ultimately 
decides the issue while the evidence is fresh in its mind. 
On appeal, the process is one step removed.  The parties and the 
court essentially rely on a lifeless record, through which the losing party 
challenges the trial judge‘s findings, while the appellate court reviews 
the circumstances and testimony anew using two different standards of 
review.  As to the trial court‘s factual findings, the standard is clear 
error.11  And as to the trial court‘s legal conclusions, the standard is de 
novo.12  Either way, the parties will characterize the evidence in the light 
most favorable to their clients.  The state again argues for an exception, 
and the defendant again takes the opposing view. 
Now, let us say that in the above scenario the state trial court and 
appellate courts all found that the local authorities violated the 
defendant‘s rights—that the warrantless search was unfounded, no 
exception applied, and that the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
unlawful search had to be quashed.  Put another way, the state trial and 
appellate courts found that federal law protected the defendant citizen 
                                                 
9 E.g., Brittany H. Southerland, Note, Lying To Catch the Bad Guy:  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
Likely Adoption of the Clear Error Standard of Review for A Denial of a Franks Hearing, 24 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 843, 855 (2008) (explaining that in challenging a search warrant, the Eleventh 
Circuit, for one, recognizes that holding an evidentiary hearing lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court); see also People v. Fisher, No. 256027, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1 
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005) (―A court deciding a suppression motion must ordinarily 
convene its own evidentiary hearing to decide the matter.‖). 
10 Matthew Bell, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness:  Why Utah Courts Should Embrace the 
Community Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 10 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 3, 39 (2005) 
(―As a general rule, courts evaluate ‗challenged searches under a standard of objective 
reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers 
involved.‘‖).  Bell goes on to explain that, in California, the trial courts consider the officers‘ 
motivation, in addition to their intent.  Id.  If the officers intended to solve a crime in 
conducting the search, the community-caretaking exception does not apply.  Id.; see also 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (noting that ―the circumstances, viewed 
objectively,‖ may justify the officer‘s actions). 
11 People v. Fisher, No. 276439, 2008 WL 786515, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008) (―In 
reviewing a trial court‘s decision following a suppression hearing, we review the trial 
court‘s factual findings for clear error, but review the legal conclusions de novo.‖). 
12 Id. 
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from the improper acts of a state actor.13  What can the state‘s attorney 
argue in response if indeed the state tribunals have interpreted the 
defendant‘s constitutional rights too broadly?  Having exhausted its 
remedies in the state appellate courts, the state‘s only remaining forum 
in which to challenge the ruling is the United States Supreme Court.  
And in Michigan v. Fisher, that is precisely what the State of Michigan 
did. 
This Article examines the ramifications of these types of challenges, 
which in the end do not curtail the states from imposing an 
unconstitutional burden on their citizens.14  Rather, they curtail the states 
from providing their citizens greater protections under the Fourth 
Amendment.  To illustrate this point, Part II will review briefly the 
concepts underlying the Fourth Amendment while comparing the 
federal requirements to prove the emergency aid exception to a 
warrantless search with the requirements in state court.  With this 
background in mind, Part III will conduct a close examination of 
Michigan v. Fisher, recounting the specific facts of the case and, of course, 
the Court‘s ultimate disposition.  Part IV considers rather closely Justice 
Stevens‘ dissent in Michigan v. Fisher, which critiques the Supreme 
Court‘s recent trend.  This section provides the reader with a unique look 
at the clash between the uniformity in federal law and the necessary 
constitutional protections proffered by the state courts.  In the end, this 
article sides with Justice Stevens and argues, quite simply, that the 
Supreme Court‘s review of these cases is needless. 
II.  COMMUNITY-CARETAKING, EMERGENCY AID, AND WARRANTLESS 
SEARCHES 
At the core of the Fourth Amendment15 is the security of one‘s right 
to privacy and the requirement of a warrant to conduct a search of one‘s 
home and effects.  In Katz v. United States, Justice Stewart affirmed ―that 
                                                 
13 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (clarifying 
that certain search and seizure cases involve the state upholding a citizen‘s right, ―finding 
the citizen to be protected under both federal and state law‖); cf. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 
1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (―[C]hoosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different 
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state‘s citizens 
from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the [F]ourth [A]mendment by the 
federal courts.‖). 
14 See Long, 463 U.S. at 1069 (explaining that the Court‘s prior inquiries involved making 
sure that the states did not vitiate their citizens‘ constitutional rights). 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‖). 
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searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.‖16  This famous pronouncement is conventionally 
known as the ―warrant preference theory‖17 of the Fourth Amendment, 
which confirms that warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable provided an exception does not exist.  After Katz, scholars 
usually discussed the theory in the context of traditional criminal 
investigations, wherein law enforcement officials were acting in an effort 
to stop individuals that were suspected of having committed a crime.18  
At the same time, a growing debate surrounded law enforcement 
officers‘ other duties, those that did not involve investigating crimes, but 
protecting and serving the public.19 
For example, officers are often called upon to assist motorists with 
broken down vehicles, to mediate noise disputes, to respond to stray 
animals, or to render aid to a sick pedestrian.20  For the most part, these 
activities are entirely non-investigatory and fall outside of the crime-
control paradigm.  Even still, in many instances these activities involve 
intrusions into individuals‘ homes, vehicles, or businesses.21  
                                                 
16 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that warrantless searches are 
unreasonable, though ―subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions‖) (citing several cases in which the Supreme Court ―emphasized that the 
mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes‖) (alteration 
in original). 
17 Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 262 (noting the ―warrant theory‖ or ―warrant preference theory‖). 
18 Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism:  Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, 
and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2009) (explaining 
that crime-stopping ―forms the backdrop for much of our thought about policework and 
underlies much Fourth Amendment doctrine‖) (footnote omitted). 
19 Bell, supra note 10, at 3; see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (―Local 
police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which 
there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be 
described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.‖).  See 
generally PETER K. MANNING, POLICE WORK:  THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING (2d 
ed. 1997) (discussing some of the other tasks that police officers are charged with, including 
helping citizens, maintaining order and the smooth flow of traffic and pedestrians, and 
routine patrol). 
20 See Livingston, supra note 17, at 272 (listing a host of activities that constitute 
―community caretaking‖ functions). 
21 See id. at 261 (describing an example in which police officers entered an apartment to 
render aid to a woman that was having a baby).  Livingston further explains that ―[i]t is not 
uncommon for police to intrude into the homes of elderly people in response to calls from 
anxious relatives unable to locate them‖ and that ―[p]olice in many places routinely enter 
commercial premises found inexplicably open at night to secure the premises and to notify 
the owners that their property has been left vulnerable to invasion.‖  Id. at 272–73. 
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Recognizing this, the federal courts sought to clarify whether police 
officers enjoyed an exception to the warrant requirement in those 
instances that they entered or searched a car, residence, or commercial 
premises when acting as a ―community-caretaker‖ as opposed to an 
investigator or crime-stopper.22 
Over time, courts operating under the warrant preference theory 
―have validated many community caretaking intrusions of this type on 
the ground that they fall within variously formulated ‗exigent 
circumstances,‘ ‗emergency,‘ and ‗rescue‘ exceptions to the probable-
cause-and-warrant formula.‖23  So much is true, though we need not 
consider the nuances of each of these exceptions.  Rather, because the 
focus of this inquiry centers on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Michigan 
v. Fisher, it is important that we consider the primary exception to the 
warrant requirement in that case—the emergency aid exception. 
A. Emergency Aid Exception 
The emergency aid doctrine originated in dictum found in Johnson v. 
United States, where Justice Jackson said, ―[t]here are exceptional 
circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law 
enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a 
magistrate‘s warrant for search may be dispensed with.‖24  Since that 
time the Supreme Court has stated, in clearer terms, that the emergency 
aid doctrine allows law enforcement officers to enter a residence or other 
establishment without a warrant so that they may render emergency aid 
to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent harm or 
injury.25  This conduct is justified, said the Supreme Court, in light of the 
                                                 
22 Courts have viewed the authority to enter a premises in response to cries for help as 
―inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace officers.‖  United States v. Barone, 330 
F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1964); see also Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 
1963) (―[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning home to rescue 
occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an 
injured person.‖). 
23 Livingston, supra note 17, at 276. 
24 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1947); see also Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971) 
(noting that the emergency aid doctrine ―had its origin in a dictum enunciated by Justice 
Jackson‖).  The Supreme Court later gave us an example of one possible emergency 
situation in which the doctrine would apply, such as ―where the officers, passing by on the 
street, hear a shot and a cry for help and demand entrance [to a residence] in the name of 
the law.‖  McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948). 
25 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978); see also Root, 438 F.2d at 364 (―[T]he 
emergency or exigency doctrine may be stated as follows:  police officers may enter a 
dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they 
reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance.‖). 
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underlying and well-recognized need to protect or preserve life.26  This 
need is so compelling, in fact, that at least one court has suggested that 
police officers have an affirmative duty to act in emergency situations.27  
In line with this reasoning, while recognizing the need to protect and 
preserve life, numerous federal and state courts have upheld warrantless 
entries in emergency situations.28 
What is more, in applying the emergency aid exception, some courts 
consider it a variation of the exigent circumstances exception, while 
others see it as a subcategory of the community-caretaking doctrine.29  
This distinction is important.  Community-caretaking, unlike traditional 
crimefighting, does not require a showing of probable cause.  On the 
other hand, to validate a warrantless entry under the exigent 
circumstances exception, the state is required to show the existence of 
both probable cause and exigency.30  This is a much heavier burden for 
the state, especially if law enforcement officers conducted a warrantless 
entry to stop a minor offense.31  Thus, when determining whether the 
                                                 
26 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392; United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(discussing Mincey, but first observing, ―[t]he most urgent emergency situation excusing 
police compliance with the warrant requirement is, of course, the need to protect or 
preserve life‖); see also State v. Frankel, 847 A.2d 561, 568 (N.J. 2004) (―The emergency aid 
doctrine is derived from the commonsense understanding that exigent circumstances may 
require public safety officials, such as the police . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant 
for the purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury.‖). 
27 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006) (―[I]t would be silly to suggest that the 
police would commit a tort by entering [a residence] . . . to determine whether violence (or 
threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur . . . .‖); see also Barone, 
330 F.2d at 545 (―Indeed it is obvious that had the patrolmen been denied entry to the 
apartment they would have had the right, if not the duty, to gain entry forcibly.‖); Wayne, 
318 F.2d at 213 (noting ―that the police had a right—if not a duty—to assume‖ that an 
emergency was taking place and that they should intervene). 
28 See United States v. Hughes, 993 F.2d 1313, 1315 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing warrantless 
entry where police responded to a report that a woman and child were in danger in a crack 
house); United States v. Gillenwaters, 890 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding warrantless 
entry justified where police enter in response to a stabbing victim); United States v. Martin, 
781 F.2d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding entry based on explosion in apartment); Mann 
v. Cannon, 731 F.2d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 1984) (allowing search where children had open access 
to controlled substances); United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding 
entry justified so that police could give emergency aid to someone they had just shot); 
Johnson v. State, 386 So. 2d 302, 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing search where police 
responded to a report of a dead body); State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 143 (Iowa 1996) 
(finding search justified when police acted pursuant to missing person report). 
29 Bell, supra note 10, at 16. 
30 E.g., Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2008). 
31 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1984) (―[T]he police bear a heavy burden 
when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or 
arrests.‖).  The Supreme Court in Welsh went on to state that the necessity for a search 
without a warrant, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception, is significantly 
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emergency aid exception applies to a warrantless search, the question is 
not whether the officer acted with probable cause when he or she 
entered the premises, but whether the officer acted reasonably when 
entering the premises to render aid or to protect an occupant.32 
Reasonableness is the keystone of the emergency aid exception.  A 
reviewing court may frame the inquiry as follows:  when entering the 
premises, ―[g]iven the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable 
officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her 
community caretaking functions?‖33  If the court answers this question in 
the affirmative, the warrantless search is usually justified under the 
emergency aid exception. 
B. The Officers’ Intent 
Let us observe the above question from another perspective.  A plain 
reading of the question reveals a second caveat beyond reasonableness—
the officer‘s perception.  This realization prompted many courts to begin 
the reasonableness inquiry with the question of what exactly the officer 
perceived.  The officer‘s state of mind when conducting the search gave 
courts a clue as to whether the officer‘s conduct was indeed reasonable.  
Working under this construct in United States v. Barone, the Second 
Circuit hinted that the emergency aid exception would not apply to cases 
in which officers entered the premises with the intent to search and 
arrest.34  So, if an officer intended to search a residence pursuant to his or 
her investigatory or crime-solving duties, then the emergency aid 
exception would not apply and the state would have to justify the search 
outside of the exception‘s confines.35 
                                                                                                             
diminished when the gravity of the offense in progress is trivial, or does not involve 
violence or threats of violence.  466 U.S. at 75152. 
32 Bell, supra note 10, at 16 (―This analytical distinction also explains why courts do not 
require probable cause when evaluating community caretaking acts including rendering 
emergency aid; instead the inquiry is governed by the Fourth Amendment mandate that 
officers act reasonably.‖). 
33 People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999). 
34 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) (―The right of the police to enter and investigate in an 
emergency without the accompanying intent to either search or arrest is inherent in the very 
nature of their duties as peace officers, and derives from the common law.‖) (emphasis 
added). 
35 Alison Sanders, Note, Constitutional Law:  State v. Nemeth—The Community Caretaker 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 32 N.M. L. REV. 291, 298 (2002).  In explaining the 
community-caretaking exception in New Mexico, Sanders states that for the exception to 
apply, ―[t]he sole motivation for entering the dwelling must be a non-criminal-related 
community caretaking function, and the officer can do no more than what is reasonably 
necessary to determine whether someone needs assistance and to provide that assistance.‖  
Id.  It is worth mentioning that the court in State v. Nemeth was concerned that if the intent 
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In line with this decision, many courts established a three-factor test 
to determine whether the emergency aid exception applied, many of 
which included a factor that turned on the officer‘s intent.  For example, 
in the oft-cited case People v. Mitchell, the New York Court of Appeals 
summarized the basic elements of the emergency aid exception as 
follows:   
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe 
that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate 
need for their assistance for the protection of life or 
property.  (2) The search must not be primarily 
motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.  (3) 
There must be some reasonable basis, approximating 
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area 
or place to be searched.36   
Using this sort of test, intent becomes a crucial part of the analysis.  In 
the end if the court finds that an officer was acting as a crime-fighter, not 
as a community-caretaker, the exception does not apply. 
All of this changed, however, after the United States Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Brigham City v. Stuart.37  In Brigham City, the Court 
recognized a gaping disparity in the standards used by both state and 
federal courts when determining the validity of warrantless searches in 
an emergency situation.  Thus, it sought to articulate ―the appropriate 
Fourth Amendment standard‖ that courts would use in their analyses 
from then on.38 
The case involved a scuffle that broke out at approximately 3:00 a.m. 
inside the home of a Brigham City, Utah resident.39  Authorities 
dispatched four officers to the home in response to a call about a loud 
party.40  As the officers arrived, they heard shouting coming from inside; 
thus, they ―proceeded down the driveway to investigate.‖41  Behind the 
                                                                                                             
element had not been established, law enforcement officers could use the emergency aid 
exception as a pretext for unjustified, warrantless searches.  State v. Nemeth, 23 P.3d 936, 
945 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
36 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976).  ―The second requirement is related to the first in that 
the protection of human life or property in imminent danger must be the motivation for the 
search rather than the desire to apprehend a suspect or gather evidence for use in a 
criminal proceeding.‖  Id. at 610. 
37 547 U.S. 398 (2006). 
38 Id. at 402.  The Court referenced state and federal cases and quoted the different 
standards used by each court to illustrate the disparity.  Id. 
39 Id. at 400. 
40 Id. at 40001. 
41 Id. at 401. 
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home, the officers entered the backyard and observed, through a screen 
door and two windows, a fight taking place inside.42  One of the officers 
witnessed four individuals trying to restrain a juvenile but having 
trouble doing so.43  The juvenile then broke free and punched one of the 
individuals in the face.44  After the punch, the officers saw the victim spit 
blood into a nearby sink, and, as he did so, the other individuals 
restrained the attacker who continued to struggle, pushing him firmly 
against a refrigerator.45  At that point, the officers took action. 
One of the officers initially pushed open the screen door and 
announced his presence, but amidst the fracas nobody noticed.  The 
officers then entered the kitchen and announced their presence again.  
This agitated the individuals because the officers had entered the 
residence without permission.46  Finally, despite the individuals‘ 
opposition, the officers entered the fray and arrested the individuals and 
charged them with ―contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
disorderly conduct, and intoxication.‖47 
1. Considering Intent in the Utah Supreme Court 
In the Utah trial court, the individuals moved to suppress all 
evidence obtained after the officers entered the residence without the 
individuals‘ permission.  Their argument was a familiar one:  because 
the officers lacked either a warrant or consent to enter the home, the 
officers‘ entry violated the Fourth Amendment.48  As it turned out, the 
state trial court agreed with the defendants.  The State appealed to the 
Utah Court of Appeals.  Again the defendants were successful.49  With 
that, the State took the case to the Utah Supreme Court, which again 
sided with the defendants. 
In affirming the Utah Court of Appeals, the Utah Supreme Court 
first noted that its goal of providing practitioners with useful guidance in 
search and seizure cases is often ―handicapped‖ because practitioners, 
for some reason, commonly fail to challenge the underlying search by 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (characterizing the person being restrained as a ―juvenile‖).  The Utah trial court 
noted in its Order that the officers had probable cause to enter the backyard of the home 
because they observed through a slat fence two juveniles drinking alcohol in the backyard.  
Brigham City v. Stuart, 57 P.3d 1111, 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
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way of the Utah Constitution.50  This was surprising, said the Utah 
Supreme Court, because while Utah courts often interpreted the state 
constitutional bar to warrantless searches similarly to the federal bar, the 
protections under state law were or could be greater than those 
guaranteed under federal law.51  With this preface, the Utah high court 
took up two issues on appeal:  (1) whether the officers‘ warrantless entry 
was justified under the emergency aid doctrine, and (2) whether the facts 
of the case were sufficient to present exigent circumstances.52  As to the 
first inquiry, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the appellate court‘s 
determination pursuant to Utah‘s three-prong test, which, like the test 
found in People v. Mitchell,53 required a finding that ―[t]he search [was] 
not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.‖54 
At the center of the high court‘s analysis was the degree of harm that 
the home‘s occupant suffered or would have suffered at the point the 
officers entered the home.55  The Utah Supreme Court stressed that if a 
reviewing court found that the occupant‘s injuries were minor, the 
necessity to conduct a warrantless entry to render aid is diminished; 
thus, the emergency aid exception would not apply.56  With this in mind, 
the Utah high court turned to the trial record, which revealed that just 
before the officers entered the home, a juvenile inside punched another 
individual in the face before the other occupants subdued him.57  This, of 
course, resulted in relatively minor injuries to the occupant, with almost 
no chance that the occupant would suffer further injury.  The Utah 
Supreme Court then concluded that the state could not invoke the 
                                                 
50 Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506, 510 (Utah 2005) (―Our aspiration to provide 
useful guidance to those charged with the day-to-day responsibility of putting search and 
seizure law into practice is handicapped by the manner in which search and seizure cases 
are presented to us.‖). 
51 Id.  The Utah Supreme Court added the following statement with respect to 
practitioners‘ failure to present challenges under the Utah Constitution: 
Where the parties do not raise or adequately brief state constitutional 
issues, our holdings become inevitably contingent.  They carry within 
them an implicit qualification that if properly invited to intervene, our 
state‘s Declaration of Rights might change the result and impose 
different demands on police officers and others who in a very real 
sense are the everyday guardians of constitutional guarantees against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Id. 
52 Id. at 512. 
53 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976). 
54 Brigham City, 122 P.3d at 512–13 (listing the elements that rendered lawful a 
warrantless entry under the emergency aid doctrine). 
55 Id. at 513. 
56 Id. (―Consequently, intrusions to administer aid to less severe injuries may render 
unconstitutional a search or seizure made incident to the warrantless entry.‖). 
57 Id. 
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emergency aid doctrine because there was nothing to support the notion 
that the officers found it necessary to render aid or medical assistance to 
the occupant that was punched in the face.58  Under the circumstances, 
the court found that the officers could have only been acting in their law 
enforcement capacity, as the officers rendered no aid but certainly made 
arrests.59 
2. The United States Supreme Court Vitiates the Intent Requirement 
Having lost in the state courts, Utah appealed the decision to the 
United States Supreme Court.  There, the defendants pointed out once 
again that the officers‘ entry was unreasonable and unjustified because 
the officers ―were more interested in making arrests than quelling 
violence.‖60  The inquiry then went right to the heart of Utah‘s intent 
requirement, which allowed the state courts to consider the officers‘ 
subjective motivations when determining the reasonableness of their 
entry.  The Supreme Court quickly rejected this approach. 
It explained that ―[a]n action is ‗reasonable‘ under the Fourth 
Amendment, regardless of the individual officer‘s state of mind, ‗as long 
as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.‘‖61  In this 
way, the Supreme Court made clear that a police officer‘s subjective 
motivation for conducting a search is irrelevant in a court‘s Fourth 
Amendment analysis.62  Applying this principle to the facts in Stuart, the 
Supreme Court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the 
officers to enter the residence and make arrests, as they had every reason 
to believe that the individual who was punched in the face might require 
help.63  It became clear that objectivity became the Court‘s primary 
concern when it stated that ―[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment 
required [the officers] to wait until another blow rendered someone 
‗unconscious‘ or ‗semi-conscious‘ or worse before entering,‖ given the 
officers‘ role to prevent violence and to restore order.64 
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 514 (―[T]he circumstances known to the officers at the time of entry did not 
create a reasonable belief that emergency aid was required.‖).  The Utah Supreme Court 
went on to discuss the application of the exigent circumstances exception, though for all 
present purposes we need not delve into that part of the opinion.  Id. at 514–18.  Also, two 
Justices of the Utah Supreme Court concurred in the majority‘s application of the 
emergency aid doctrine, but dissented as to its application of the exigent circumstances 
exception.  Id. at 518–21.  This has no bearing on this Article‘s analysis.   
60 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006). 
61 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 406. 
64 Id. 
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Justice Stevens concurred in the decision but nevertheless noted that 
―[f]ederal interests are not offended when a single State elects to provide 
greater protection for its citizens than the Federal Constitution 
requires.‖65  He was clearly concerned with the Supreme Court‘s role in 
the decision, as he saw it as an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
exercise judicial restraint, as opposed to having the last word in legal 
interpretation.  For Justice Stevens, there was no need for the Supreme 
Court to intervene.  He therefore stated that, despite his concurrence 
with the majority, he ―remain[ed] persuaded that [his] vote to deny the 
State‘s petition for certiorari was correct.‖66 
After Brigham City, it was lawful for police officers to enter a house 
or building without probable cause so long as they had an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that there was a danger inside.67  Their 
subjective intent was inconsequential.  Indeed, armed with an honest 
belief regarding some danger, officers could enter a house or building 
and dispel that danger regardless of whether their primary motivation 
was to gather evidence or to make arrests.68  These pronouncements, 
however, would not stay untested for long. 
III.  MICHIGAN V. FISHER:  AFFIRMING WHAT IS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE 
The United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Brigham City 
forecasted how the Court would approach similar constitutional 
challenges in the future.  Intent was no longer part of the analysis, at 
least not under federal law.  Again, if the defendant challenged an 
officer‘s entry under state law, the state court was free to consider the 
                                                 
65 Id. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
66 Id.; see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―[It is] my 
belief that a policy of judicial restraint—one that allows other decisional bodies to have the 
last word in legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for this Court to intervene—
enables this Court to make its most effective contribution to our federal system of 
government.‖). 
67 Craig M. Bradley, A Sensible Emergency Doctrine, 42 TRIAL 60, 61 (Aug. 2006); see also 
United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 287 n.2 (6th Cir. 2009) (―[O]nce the police 
become aware of a battery, they need not wait to intervene until the threat becomes life-
threatening lest a court hold there was no exigency.‖). 
68 Bradley, supra note 67, at 61.  Bradley also offers an example in which the exception 
would not apply—when ―two officers hear a scream from a nearby apartment and hear 
someone say ‗Here‘s Johnny‘ in a menacing voice.‖  Id. at 62.  If one officer stops the other 
officer from entering the apartment because he knows the voice came from a television 
playing the movie The Shining, then it would be unreasonable for the officers to believe a 
real emergency is present.  Id.; see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006) 
(commenting that in a case involving domestic abuse an officer‘s entry would be lawful, 
without a warrant or probable cause, if the officer had ―good reason to believe‖ a threat of 
domestic violence existed). 
Colunga: When the Supreme Court Departs from Its Traditional Function
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
60 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
officer‘s intent in conducting the challenged search and to provide its 
citizens greater protections.  As Brigham City showed, however, a 
challenge under the Fourth Amendment would yield a different result. 
To illustrate this point, and to examine how the Supreme Court‘s 
role has changed when considering a constitutional challenge from a 
state court‘s interpretation of federal law, this section shall explore 
closely the Supreme Court‘s decision in Michigan v. Fisher.  In doing so, 
this section will first examine the rulings in the Michigan state courts and 
then provide a detailed analysis of the Supreme Court‘s decision.  This 
section will also reflect on Justice Stevens‘ dissent, in which he confirms 
his sentiment regarding the Supreme Court‘s changing role. 
A. Factual History 
Fisher involves a rather simple set of facts, which for the most part 
are taken from the evidentiary hearing that took place before the 
Michigan trial court.  At the evidentiary hearing, a single police officer 
recounted the incident.  He and another officer responded to a residence 
after receiving reports of unusual noises and erratic behavior.69  
Apparently, some time prior, a pedestrian approached the officers and 
complained that a man was ―going . . . crazy‖ inside a home.70  When the 
officers arrived at the residence and exited their vehicle, they 
immediately noticed that someone had ―smashed out‖ several of the 
residence‘s windows.71  Further, as the officers approached the house 
and surveyed the scene outside, they observed that some of the home‘s 
fence posts had been damaged and that a nearby truck had its front end 
―smashed,‖ as though whoever was driving the truck struck the fence.72  
Upon inspection, the officers saw what they perceived to be fresh blood 
on the truck‘s hood and on some clothing that was still inside the truck.73 
                                                 
69 People v. Fisher, No. 256027, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).  In 
2005, the Michigan Appellate Court described the facts according to the criminal complaint 
filed with the trial court.  Id. at *1 n.1.  At this point, the Michigan trial court had not yet 
conducted an evidentiary hearing with respect to defendant‘s motion to suppress; it simply 
suppressed the evidence from the bench.  Id. at *1.  Defendant appealed, and the Michigan 
Appellate Court determined whether the trial court erred in deciding the issue without an 
evidentiary hearing.  Id.  Ultimately the Appellate Court found that it did.  Id. at *2. 
70 People v. Fisher, No. 276439, 2008 WL 786515, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008) 
(examining the trial court record).  For some reason, the incident‘s factual account differs 
from court to court.  The facts that we include here attempt to include details that the 
Michigan Appellate Court did not mention, while the Michigan trial court did, or vice 
versa. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.; see also Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1 (describing that a nearby vehicle struck the 
fence and was parked near the front door of the residence). 
73 Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *1. 
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From outside, the officers could see inside the home.74  They heard 
and saw a man inside ―walking around the residence screaming and 
throwing stuff.‖75  One officer added that he could hear objects breaking 
inside,76 though he said nothing about the possibility of other 
individuals being present inside the home.  As the officers advanced, 
they again observed what they perceived to be blood on the back door.77  
At that point, one of the officers knocked on the back door and 
announced the officers‘ presence, but the man inside the home refused to 
answer.78  When the officers persisted, the man responded with 
profanity and declared that he would not let the officers in without a 
warrant.79  The officers decided to enter. 
At the evidentiary hearing, the officer admitted that when the 
officers decided to enter the residence they did not know whether there 
was anyone else inside.80  The officers were merely concerned ―[b]ecause 
of the amount of blood [the officers] found on the outside‖ of the 
residence.81  Notwithstanding this testimony, on cross-examination the 
officer admitted that he and the others did not observe a large amount of 
blood outside the home, but rather they observed ―mere drops.‖82  When 
pressed, the officer also admitted ―that he had not known whether 
defendant drove the truck at the scene, how the fence was damaged, or 
whether anyone in the house actually needed medical assistance.‖83 
                                                 
74 People v. Fisher, 765 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Mich. 2009) (―The officers went to Allen Road and 
saw a man later identified as defendant, Jeremy Fisher, through the front window of a 
house . . . .‖). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  But see Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1 (recounting from the criminal complaint, to 
which the officer attested, that the officer saw blood on the home‘s front door). 
78 Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *1. 
79 Id. (noting that the man answered with profanity); see also Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at 
*1 (explaining that the officers induced the defendant ―to state that he would not let them 
in if they did not have a warrant‖). 
80 Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *1. 
81 Fisher, 765 N.W.2d at 20 (quoting the trial court testimony) (alteration in original). 
82 Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *2. 
83 Id.  Before the evidentiary hearing, Judge Borello strongly disagreed with the 
majority‘s decision to send the case back to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing.  Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *3 (Borello, J., dissenting).  As to the emergency aid 
exception, Judge Borello found it unavailing, noting: 
Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that whenever the police 
have a basis for supposing that a person has been injured, they are 
entitled to enter that person‘s home without a warrant ostensibly to 
provide aid.  Further, there is no indication that the police inquired 
about defendant‘s condition, or observed any injury about him.  Nor is 
there any suggestion that the police ever suspected that someone else 
in the house may have been injured. 
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Despite all doubt, the officer testified that at some point he noticed a 
cut on the man‘s hand.84  It remained unclear, however, when or how the 
officer observed the cut because the officers were yet to enter the 
residence.  Initially, one of the officers pushed open the front door only a 
short distance because a piece of furniture blocked the door.85  The 
officer yelled at the man to come to the door; he again responded with 
profanities.86  The officers then pushed the door open approximately 
twelve to eighteen inches.87  Then, as the testifying officer stepped 
forward, he heard a dog bark and looked to his right.88  At that point he 
was able to see inside the home through the glass front door and 
observed the man sitting on a bed, raising a rifle, and pointing it directly 
at him.89  The officers drew back immediately and left the scene.90  When 
they returned with a warrant, the man surrendered quietly.91 
B. Michigan State Court Findings 
Authorities charged the man with assault with a dangerous weapon 
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.92  Prior to 
trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence of what the officers 
observed inside the house.  The trial court initially granted the motion 
without conducting an evidentiary hearing.93  The trial court was 
convinced, based solely on the transcript for the swearing out of the 
complaint, that the emergency aid exception did not apply and thus the 
officers‘ entry was unlawful.94  The state appealed and the appellate 
court remanded the case so that the trial court could conduct a full 
evidentiary hearing.95 
The second time around, the trial court heard the officers‘ live 
testimony and ultimately concluded that ―based on what I‘ve heard here, 
                                                                                                             
Id. at *4. 
84 Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *1 (―The officer described noticing a cut on defendant‘s 
hand.‖). 
85 Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1. 
86 Id. (characterizing the man‘s statement as one of ―defiance‖). 
87 Id.; People v. Fisher, 765 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Mich. 2009). 
88 Fisher, 765 N.W.2d at 20. 
89 Id.; Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1 (noting that the officer ―observed defendant raise a 
long gun and point it at him‖). 
90 Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1. 
91 Id. (explaining that when the police returned with a search warrant the defendant 
surrendered without incident). 
92 E.g., People v. Fisher, No. 276439, 2008 WL 786515, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 
2008). 
93 Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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I‘m even more convinced‖ that the search involved an unlawful entry.96  
Again, the trial court granted the defendant‘s motion to suppress and, 
again, the state appealed the judgment.  In deciding whether the 
emergency aid exception applied, and in affirming the trial court‘s 
findings, the appellate court confirmed ―that the situation the police 
witness described in this case did not rise to a level of emergency 
justifying the warrantless intrusion into a residence.‖97  One of the 
justices filed a dissent, however, believing that the evidence was 
sufficient to show that it was reasonable for the officer to believe that the 
man was in need of assistance, which is all the emergency aid exception 
requires.98  For the dissent, it made no difference that the evidence could 
not support the existence of an immediate medical emergency, as it was 
enough that the officer believed that one existed.99 
The state took the case to the Michigan Supreme Court.  In the end, 
though the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the parties‘ briefs and 
heard oral arguments, it ultimately decided to vacate its prior order that 
granted the state‘s application for leave to appeal, thus denying the 
application altogether.100  Two justices dissented.  One of them simply 
stated that it would have reversed the appellate court‘s judgment, citing 
the dissenting opinion.101  The other took it a step further, examining the 
underlying facts and emphasizing that for the emergency aid exception 
to apply, the officers‘ subjective motivations were irrelevant.102  The 
dissent highlighted that after Brigham City, the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, must have justified the officers‘ conduct while the officers‘ 
states of mind were irrelevant.103  Based on the evidence before the trial 
court, the dissent explained: 
Faced with an irrational and violent man, who was 
creating a disturbance and not responding to the police 
officers, and a blood trail leading from a truck to the 
house, Officer Goolsby could reasonably believe that 
someone inside, including defendant, needed medical 
assistance.  Indeed, as [the prior dissent] observed, ―it 
                                                 
96 Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *2 (quoting the trial court record). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at *4 (Talbot, J., dissenting) (―Given defendant‘s bizarre behavior, it was reasonable 
for officers to surmise that he might need medical or psychiatric intervention to prevent 
from incurring injury . . . which [may have been] not readily observable . . . .‖). 
99 Id. 
100 People v. Fisher, 765 N.W.2d 19, 19 (Mich. 2009). 
101 Id. (Weaver, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 21 (Young, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 21 n.11. 
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was reasonable for officers to surmise that [defendant] 
might need medical or psychiatric intervention to 
prevent him from incurring injury.‖104 
The dissent, in the end, determined that although the drops of blood 
on the scene may have indicated only a minor injury, the law after 
Brigham City does not require an officer to view or confirm a severe 
injury before conducting a search pursuant to the emergency aid 
exception.105  Indeed, so long as the officers maintained a reasonable 
belief that the defendant or someone inside the home required medical 
assistance, the officers‘ entry would be justified under the exception.106  
Accordingly, the dissent suggested a reversal and remand for further 
proceedings.107  Seizing the opportunity, the state appealed the judgment 
to the United States Supreme Court. 
C. United States Supreme Court Review 
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court recounted the facts in 
Fisher and worked under the following premise:  ―[a] straightforward 
application of the emergency aid exception, as in Brigham City, dictates 
that the officer‘s entry was reasonable.‖108  To that end, the Court walked 
through what it perceived to be several similarities between the facts in 
Fisher‘s case and those in Brigham City.109  It noted that in both cases 
police officers were responding to a report of some sort of disturbance 
and when the officers arrived on the scene ―they encountered a 
tumultuous situation in the house.‖110  The Court‘s description of that 
―tumultuous situation,‖ however, requires a close examination. 
When describing the scene in Fisher, the Supreme Court made much 
of the fact that the officers could see Fisher inside the home screaming 
                                                 
104 Id. at 21 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *4 (Talbot, 
J., dissenting)). 
105 Id. at 22. 
106 Id.; see also Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998) (―Courts must apply 
an objective standard to determine the reasonableness of the officer‘s belief.‖).  Tierney had 
somewhat of a limited scope, as the court considered the necessity for officers to intervene 
in domestic disputes.  The court went on to say, ―[c]ourts have recognized the combustible 
nature of domestic disputes, and have accorded great latitude to an officer‘s belief that 
warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances when the officer had substantial 
reason to believe that one of the parties to the dispute was in danger.‖  Tierney, 133 F.3d at 
197. 
107 Fisher, 765 N.W.2d at 22 (Young, J., dissenting). 
108 Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009). 
109 Id. at 548–49. 
110 Id. at 548. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/3
2010] When the Supreme Court Departs 65 
and throwing things.111  And though the Court found this similar to the 
conduct displayed in Brigham City, the Court ignored an obvious 
difference—the officers in Fisher confirmed that they did not see anyone 
aside from Fisher inside the home, whereas the officers in Brigham City 
witnessed firsthand one individual strike another individual, who then 
spat blood in the sink.  Ignoring this distinction, the Court determined 
that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to assume, merely 
because they saw Fisher throwing things, that whatever it was that 
Fisher was throwing ―might have a human target.‖112  As such, the Court 
confirmed that police officers need not have ―ironclad proof of‖ an injury 
to invoke the emergency aid exception; they simply must have an 
objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone is injured and 
requires assistance.113 
Subsequently, the Court explained that the Michigan Court of 
Appeals erred when it replaced the objective inquiry ―with its hindsight 
determination that there was in fact no emergency.‖114  The state court, in 
essence, required more than the Fourth Amendment demands.  Given 
the needs of law enforcement, and keeping in mind the demands of 
public safety, the Supreme Court stressed that Fisher did not involve the 
type of situation from which officers would be required and expected to 
walk away.115  In the end, it was objectively reasonable that they did not. 
IV.  THE EFFECT OF OVERRULING STATE COURTS THAT INTERPRET THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TOO BROADLY 
Michigan v. Fisher included one brief dissent.  In it, Justice Stevens, 
joined by the newly appointed Justice Sotomayor, made clear that he was 
not at all pleased with the majority‘s decision to review the case, noting 
―it is hard to see how the Court is justified in micromanaging the day-to-
day business of state tribunals making fact-intensive decisions of this 
                                                 
111 Id. at 549. 
112 Id.  The ―projectiles‖ may have been aimed at a spouse or a child, which is rather 
speculative because, again, there is nothing in the record to suggest that anyone other than 
Fisher was inside the home.  Id. 
113 Id. (clarifying that ―the test, as we have said, is not what [the officer] believed, but 
whether there was ‗an objectively reasonable basis for believing‘ that medical assistance 
was needed, or persons were in danger‖) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 
(2006); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)).  We can liken this reasonableness 
determination to the arbitrary and capricious standard, which requires an administrative 
body to simply have the ability to justify its decision with the facts in the record.  If the 
facts support its decision, then the district court must affirm. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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kind.‖116  He went on, saying that the Supreme Court ―ought not usurp 
the role of the factfinder when faced with a close question of the 
reasonableness of an officer‘s actions, particularly in a case tried in a 
state court.‖117  Stevens obviously took issue with the Supreme Court‘s 
role in the case.  Indeed, he expressed similar frustrations in the past, 
most notably in Brigham City v. Stuart, which we examined above.  On 
several occasions, in fact, Stevens has articulated the same sentiment he 
expressed in Fisher—that the Supreme Court was unnecessarily having 
the last word in cases where state courts protected their citizens‘ Fourth 
Amendment rights too much.118  This practice, says Stevens, departs 
from tradition and compromises the Supreme Court‘s conventionally 
deferential relationship with the states‘ trial and appellate courts.119 
A. An Effective Contribution 
In Stuart, Stevens stressed that a policy of judicial restraint enables 
the Supreme Court ―to make its most effective contribution to our 
federal system of government.‖120  He borrowed this language from his 
thoughtful dissent in Michigan v. Long, a case decided almost two 
decades before, in which he saw the opportunity to discuss and outline 
the relationship between the federal government and the sovereign 
states, specifically the State of Michigan.121  What is more, Stevens raises 
an interesting question regarding the allocation of the Supreme Court‘s 
resources.  In the past, he notes, the Court would not bother with cases in 
                                                 
116 Id. at 550–51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Stevens hinted that he remained unconvinced 
that the state court had gotten it wrong in the first place, and characterized the Supreme 
Court‘s conclusion as an ―assumption‖ based on a close question of fact.  Id. 
117 Id. at 551. 
118 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006); see also Bonventre, supra note 3, at 846–
47 (noting that the Supreme Court is not reviewing cases in which the states‘ highest courts 
have failed to protect their citizens‘ rights and liberties, but cases ―where the Court finds 
fault with the state courts for protecting rights and liberties too much‖). 
119 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―The nature of 
the case before us hardly compels a departure from tradition.‖); see also Melanie D. Wilson, 
The Return of Reasonableness: Saving the Fourth Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008) (―Given the clear and well-established rule of deference to fact-
finders‘ determinations, when the Court assesses or re-assesses facts on its way to deciding 
whether a search or seizure was reasonable, the Court‘s decisions appear result-oriented.‖). 
120 Stuart, 547 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―Indeed, I continue to believe ‗that a 
policy of judicial restraint—one that allows other decisional bodies to have the last word in 
legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for this Court to intervene—enables this Court 
to make its most effective contribution to our federal system of government.‘‖) (quoting 
Long, 463 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
121 Long, 463 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―The case raises profoundly significant 
questions concerning the relationship between two sovereigns—the State of Michigan and 
the United States of America.‖). 
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which the state courts provided greater protections to their own 
citizens.122  And when the Supreme Court started to hear these cases, 
Stevens tells us that litigants on behalf of the states flooded the Court‘s 
docket and requested, at an alarming rate, that the Court reverse state 
court judgments in favor of their citizens.123 
The issue here, however, is not economic.  Stevens is not asserting 
that the Supreme Court is wasting its resources in reviewing these cases.  
What is happening is that the Supreme Court is overruling cases that 
would have had the same outcome if the challenge was brought 
pursuant to state law.  In other words, in a case involving the emergency 
aid exception, if the defendant moved to quash the evidence as a 
violation of state law, as opposed to the Fourth Amendment, then the 
state court would be free to operate outside the confines of federal law.124  
In this way, the state court can consider the officer‘s motives and intent 
while providing greater protections to its citizens and thus shielding 
them from what the Supreme Court has defined as ―reasonable.‖125  The 
Supreme Court, in the end, would have no reason to review such a case; 
thus, a question remains as to why the Supreme Court would see fit to 
do so when a Fourth Amendment question is not at stake.126 
Moreover, Stevens reminds us that the traditional role of the 
Supreme Court in reviewing state court decisions is to ensure that the 
state is providing sufficient rights to its citizens.127  In the same vein, 
scholars have described the Supreme Court as a ―guardian,‖ functioning 
as a safeguard of citizens‘ fundamental rights and liberties.128  The Court, 
                                                 
122 Id. at 1069.  Here Stevens recounts that in 1953 the Supreme Court heard only one case 
in which the Court reviewed a state court‘s ruling in favor of its citizen.  Id.  In 1968, the 
Court did not review any.  Id.  Nevertheless, he says, at some point during the late 1970s 
the Court‘s ―priorities shifted.‖  Id. at 1069–70. 
123 Id. at 1070 (―The result is a docket swollen with requests by States to reverse 
judgments that their courts have rendered in favor of their citizens.‖). 
124 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506, 510 (Utah 2005). 
125 See Wilson, supra note 119, at 36 (criticizing generally the Supreme Court‘s assessment 
of what is reasonable, arguing that ―the Court‘s case outcomes in cases involving mixed 
issues of reasonableness are inconsistent, seemingly result-oriented, and they often defy 
common-sense notions of how reasonable citizens respond to police demands‖) (footnote 
omitted). 
126 See generally Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States:  Supreme Court Review of State-
Court State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 82 (2002) (―Indeed, the Court has long 
recognized that where a state-court judgment rests on an ‗adequate and independent‘ state-
law ground . . . the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review even a federal question the 
state court decided too, no matter how wrong the state court got it.‖). 
127 See Long, 463 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―I believe that in reviewing the 
decisions of state courts, the primary role of this Court is to make sure that persons who 
seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard.‖). 
128 Bonventre, supra note 3, at 844. 
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in essence, concerned itself with the enforcement of federal constitutional 
guarantees, while it did not trouble itself with the correction of state 
court decisions that went above and beyond protecting those same 
guarantees the first time around.  One scholar summarized the problem 
as follows: 
The Court is declaring emphatically and unambiguously 
to state courts:  You have no authority to provide more 
protection for American Constitutional rights than the 
bare minimum.  Protect local rights under local law all 
you want, the Court is saying, but not those rights and 
liberties and freedoms to which the nation as a whole is 
dedicated.129 
Such a declaration is unfounded in light of the Court‘s traditional role.  It 
is indeed critical that the Court wrangle less with cases in which citizens‘ 
rights are ―overprotected‖ and focus more on cases in which those rights 
have been abridged.  Recognizing that the Court serves as our guardian 
of rights and liberties, Stevens‘s concerns become rather compelling.  But 
there is indeed another concern. 
B. The Problem With Reassessing Facts 
Fourth Amendment cases, including those that involve the 
emergency aid exception, often turn on a close examination of the facts 
adduced at the evidentiary hearing.130  The trial court is present to hear 
the witnesses and evaluate their demeanor first hand.131  It is difficult, 
then, to truly and properly judge a witness‘s credibility based on a 
lifeless record,132 unless of course the record reflects that the witness at 
                                                 
129 Id. at 852. 
130 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2009) (turning to the 
alleged facts and finding that the emergency aid exception did not apply because officers 
had no reasonable basis to believe that the defendant needed immediate medical attention); 
United States v. Venters, 539 F.3d 801, 807–08 (7th Cir. 2008) (examining the trial record 
and concluding that warrantless entry was valid where officers had knowledge of a child 
inside the premises, which they knew was a dangerous environment used in meth 
manufacturing, it was extremely filthy, the defendant was addicted to drugs, and they 
were responding to a report of neglect); United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 410–11 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (finding that warrantless entry was unjustified where officers did not observe 
blood, physical illness, or any outward signs that someone was carried or dragged). 
131 Wilson, supra note 119, at 36. 
132 Id. at 36–37 (―Credibility cannot be determined on a cold, written record.‖); see also 
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (―When, for example, the issue involves the 
credibility of witnesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are 
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some point gave inconsistent testimony.  In this light, appellate courts 
will often defer to the factual findings of the trial court, which in turn 
protects the appellate courts‘ time and resources.133 
More importantly, however, despite the resources that the appellate 
court may or may not save, the deference that it gives to the trial courts 
cannot be underestimated.  In those instances in which the Supreme 
Court reviews the facts of a particular case—often for the fourth time on 
appeal—it runs the risk of usurping the role of the trial court and 
injecting itself into a factual squabble with which it generally has no 
interest.  And because the Court is not present to see, hear, and consider 
the factual presentation first-hand, the Court‘s evidentiary conclusions 
and self-serving characterizations, for the most part, will seem ―result-
oriented.‖134  This is not to say that the Supreme Court should avoid 
reviewing the facts of a particular case.  Instead, it should avoid re-
characterizing and molding the facts in a way that conflicts with the 
lower courts‘ interpretation in an attempt to support the conclusion it 
seeks to achieve.  When the Court substitutes its judgment for what 
happened in a case involving the emergency aid exception, or any 
Fourth Amendment determination, the ultimate disposition tends to lose 
credibility.135 
                                                                                                             
compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process of applying law to fact to the 
trial court and according its determinations presumptive weight.‖). 
133 See Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal 
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 483 (2004) (―A second justification for appellate deference 
to lower court findings of fact has to do with the economical use of judicial resources.‖); see 
also Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 233, 239-40 (2009) (explaining that the appellate court is most concerned 
with ascertaining whether the trial court correctly applied the law, not with determining 
the underlying facts, as that would ―result in a poor use of judicial resources‖). 
134 Wilson, supra note 119, at 28. 
135 Id. at 39 (asserting that when the Court goes beyond its role of establishing clear rules 
defining what it means to be reasonable under a particular set of circumstances and instead 
second-guesses conclusions of fact finders and evaluating citizens‘ beliefs, ―the Court 
reaches problematic results‖).  Wilson points out that the fact finders also benefit from 
understanding the local customs in the region in which they sit, and that appellate courts, 
which are removed from that region, ―cannot replicate these experiences and are, therefore, 
at a disadvantage to decide factual issues accurately and fairly.‖  Id. at 37.  I personally 
question the importance of local custom, though Wilson makes a fair point.  Kenneth 
Brown critiques appellate courts by stating as follows: 
Most trial judges will not substitute their judgment for that of the 
jury‘s because of respect for and deference to the integrity of the fact 
finding process.  Yet, appellate courts in the name of harmless error 
have no hesitation in trampling that fact finding process to reach a 
result they consider correct, regardless of the right affected. 
Kenneth R. Brown, Constitutional Harmless Error or Appellate Arrogance, 6 UTAH B.J. 18, 20 
(Jan. 1993). 
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Moreover, the practice of deferring to the lower courts‘ factual 
findings and reasonableness determinations in Fourth Amendment cases 
preserves the integrity of the state trial and appellate courts.136  There is 
no need for the Supreme Court to reverse the state courts when they do 
no harm to their state citizens.137  Such cases generally involve only state 
actors.  And, again, there is no violation of those state actors‘ federal 
constitutional rights.  Rather, these cases involve a constitutional right 
that the state courts have either protected or redressed, and it is that 
protection that the state asks the Supreme Court to limit.138  Proper 
deference to the facts that the lower courts have considered and 
developed not only creates a more efficient judicial system, but it also 
allows the Supreme Court to return to its traditional function, as the 
lower courts enjoy their traditional function.  There simply is no need to 
disrupt this relationship. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Michigan v. Fisher, the United State Supreme Court reversed the 
state courts‘ findings that the emergency aid exception did not justify a 
group of officers‘ warrantless entry into the defendant‘s home.  In doing 
so, the Court neither pronounced new law regarding the Fourth 
Amendment nor did it enforce any federal constitutional guarantees.  To 
be sure, there were not any rights or liberties at stake.  Instead, the Court 
simply disagreed with the state courts‘ determinations that their own 
citizens should be afforded greater protections than federal law required.  
Justice Stevens has taken issue with similar decisions in the past and has 
made clear that the Supreme Court operates in an inefficient manner 
when it departs from its traditional role.  The Court generally had no 
interest in these types of cases but nevertheless began injecting itself into 
factual determinations and disagreeing with the conclusions of the state 
                                                 
136 Mark A. Bross, Comment, The Impact of Ornelas v. United States on the Appellate 
Standard of Review for Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 877 
(2007) (―Deference to the trial court‘s findings of fact . . . minimizes the risk of judicial error 
by assigning decision-making responsibility to the court that is best-suited to make the 
decision.‖). 
137 Perhaps a more prudent order of the Supreme Court would be to vacate the lower 
court‘s decision with instructions as to the proper standard it need apply on remand.  See 
Sena Ku, Comment, The Supreme Court’s GVR Power:  Drawing A Line Between Deference and 
Control, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 409 (2008) (explaining that vacating and remanding can be 
viewed as a training instrument to make state courts ―more accountable, efficient, and 
‗accurate‘ in deciding points of law‖) (quoting Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 168 
(1996)).  This preserves the trial court‘s integrity somewhat, though there is still no need to 
vacate a decision when a state court simply protects its citizens too much; thus, our 
concerns here still would exist. 
138 Bonventre, supra note 3, at 851–52. 
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courts.  If we view the Supreme Court as a guardian of rights and 
liberties, this practice simply does not make sense.  This practice is one 
that the Supreme Court can easily curb, and ought to curb, so that it can 
once again ensure, without distraction, that our constitutional rights are 
adequately protected. 
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